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I.C.R. 11(f)(1)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Melissa

Kay

Foeller appeals from the district court’s order of restitution.

After she

was

convicted 0f two counts 0f grand theft and one count 0f income tax evasion, she argues that the

district

court abused

Commission

discretion by,

ﬁrst,

awarding restitution t0 the Idaho State Tax

amount of the income taxes she evaded and, second, by

the

in

its

appropriately consider her ﬁnancial resources, needs,

restitution in

Statement

an amount equal to what she

Of The

Melissa

Facts

Kay

stole

And Course Of The

Foeller

and earning

failing

t0

When awarding

ability

from her employer.

Proceedings

was charged by indictment with ﬁve counts of grand

theft,

one

charge each for each 0f the ﬁve years, beginning in December of 2013 and extending until July of

2017, over which she allegedly embezzled
for

whom

money from

she worked as a payroll accountant—in an amount totaling $528,61

pp. 1-4, 9.)

Theme

her employer—Silverwood

1.1 1.

(Conf. Docs.,

She allegedly embezzled more money over a longer period 0f time, but the

could charge only for the previous ﬁve years.

state

Another Silverwood

(Conf. Docs., p. 9.)

employee, Christopher Wyatt, was separately charged for embezzling

Park,

money from

Silverwood.

(Conf. Docs., p. 9.)

Foeller accepted a pre-trial settlement offer in

amended indictment reducing
of felony tax evasion.

amended indictment

the

ﬁve grand

(R., p. 56.)

which she agreed

theft charges t0

She additionally agreed

two and
to

pay

t0 plead guilty to

stating

an

an additional charge

restitution.

(R., p. 56.)

The

alleged one count of grand theft associated with the period between

December 0f 2013 and December of 2015; one count of grand

theft associated

With the period

between January 0f 2016 and July 0f 2017; and one count of tax evasion.

—

(R., pp. 63-64.1)

The

district court

imposed uniﬁed terms of fourteen years with three years ﬁxed on each 0f the grand

theft counts,

and a uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁve years With three years ﬁxed 0n the tax evasion count,

all

Foeller entered guilty pleas to those charges.

to run concurrently.

The

state

(TL, p. 114, L. 21

ﬁled a Second

— p.

(TL, p. 93, L. 5

p. 98, L. 24.2)

sentences

115, L. 2; R., pp. 91-953)

Amended Memorandum of Restitution,

requesting $5,000.00 for

Silverwood Theme Park; $535,952.87 t0 Travelers Casualty Surety Company; and $48,775.00 t0
the Idaho State

Tax Commission.

(R., pp.

103-044) At the restitution hearing, Foeller indicated

that she stipulated t0 the $5,000.00, reﬂecting half

intended to contest the other requests.

testiﬁed that

it

was Silverwood’s

0f Silverwood’s insurance deductible, but

(TL, p. 119, Ls. 5-17.)

insurer and

it

A representative

from Travelers

t0 reimburse

Silverwood for

payed $535,952.87

1

Though not particularly important for purposes 0f this appeal, Foeller incorrectly states that the
amended indictment “omitted the 2013 theft.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 3, n. 1.) The original
Indictment alleged grand theft in Count I as having been committed in December 0f 2013 (Conf.
D0cs., p.

1),

committed
20 1 8 theft.

in

2

and the Amended Indictment alleged grand

December of 2013

(R., p. 63).

theft in

What the Amended

“Tr.” refers t0 the ﬁle titled “Transcripts Appeal

Volume

1

Count

I

as having

Indictment in fact omitted

4-10-2020

“
.

.

.

been
is

the

That ﬁle includes

the transcript from the grand jury proceedings, the sentencing hearing, and the restitution hearing.

For ease of reference, the
3

state will refer t0 the

The Judgement and Sentence

initially

pagination of that ﬁle as a whole.

entered

the district court mistakenly listed the

by

sentences as running consecutively. (R., pp. 82-85.)
4
The ﬁrst Memorandum 0f Restitution ﬁled by the state did not include any amount for the

Idaho State Tax Commission because Foeller had not yet been charged with tax evasion. (R., p.
5 1 .) It also included a request that Travelers be paid $987,43 1 .60, apparently reﬂecting the entire

amount Travelers paid

t0

Mr. Wyatt, as well as the

it

for the

embezzlement by both Foeller and

by Silverwood to Travelers. (R., p. 51;
0f Restitution added the request for the Idaho

entire 10,000 deductible paid

p. 46.) The Amended Memorandum
Tax Commission. (R., pp. 71-72.) The Second Amended Memorandum of

Conf. Docs.,
State

Silverwood t0 compensate

reduced the amounts requested for Travelers and Silverwood.

Restitution

the grand thefts of

which Foeller was convicted.

representative from the Idaho State

Tax Commission testiﬁed

between 2013 and 2017, including but not limited

t0 the

p.

money

A

130, L. 5.)

that Foeller failed to report

she should have paid in additional income tax over that period

— p.

—

(TL, p. 129, L. 9

income

she embezzled, and the amount

was $48,775.00. (TL,

p. 133, L.

1

138, L. 7.)

Foeller again stated that she did not contest the request for $5,000 to Silverwood. (Tn, p.

With respect

147, Ls. 17-23.)

that that

t0 the request for the Idaho State

amount was not an “economic

“revenue”

owed

argued that the

total

—

p. 150, L. 16.)

The court ruled from
155, L. 12.)

The court found

income tax evasion”

The court

“fa11[]

further held that

(T12, p. 147, L.

the bench, awarding

that taxes

owed

17

all

— p.

to the state

it

was appropriate

(R., pp.

to

do

so.

it

was

was not compensable

in

t0 the request for Travelers, she

there

was n0

“indication that she’s

149, L. 17.)

p. 150, L.

20 —

p.

and forming the basis of the “offense of

Within the deﬁnition 0f an economic loss.”

conﬁnement, she should be able

10).

it

amounts requested. (TL,

for Foeller to

she had embezzled and, because she could resume

an order for restitution

and so

With respect

amount should not be awarded because

ever going t0 be able t0 pay that.”

Foeller argued

loss” 0r “out-of-pocket expense” because

t0 the state, the “State has paid nothing,”

(TL, p. 149, L. 18

restitution.

Tax Commission,

be required

work when

(TL, p. 154, L. 18

—

(T12, p. 154, Ls. 5-17.)

to

pay back the amounts

released from her term 0f

p. 155, L. 5.)

The court entered

105-06) and Foeller ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal (R., pp. 108-

ISSUES
Foeller states the issues on appeal as:

I.

Should

Court vacate the restitution order because the

this

erred, as a matter

II.

of law, when

it

Commission

for estimated

Should

Court vacate the restitution order because the

this

income tax?

abused

its

t0 ever

repay the amount 0f the award that

discretion

by

district court

included an award to the Idaho State Tax

failing t0 adequately consider
it

district court

Ms. Foeller’s

ability

ordered?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Foeller failed t0 show that the district court erred by concluding that evaded income
taxes are economic losses suffered by the Idaho State Tax Commission for purposes of
restitution?

II.

Has Foeller Failed

t0

show

that the district court

considered her future ability t0 pay restitution,

it

abused

its

discretion because, while

did not “adequately” d0 so?

it

ARGUMENT
I.

Has Not Shown The District Court Erred BV Ordering That She Pay $48,775.00 In
Restitution For Unpaid Income Taxes Following Her Conviction For Income Tax Evasion

Foeller

A.

Introduction

The

district

court’s

Commission representing
and 2017.

restitution

the

order included $48,775.00 t0 the Idaho

makes two arguments 0n appeal

conclusion that that amount was not an economic loss compensable in restitution.

statutory

She argues

scheme

set forth in

Idaho Income Tax Act t0 be the exclusive mechanism for assessing

8-10 (emphasis original).)

She also argues

that

in restitution.

(Appellant’s

153 Idaho 882, 292 P.3d 273 (2013), are not compensable in restitution.

brief, pp. 10-1 1.)

Both arguments are Without merit, and the ﬁrst

never argued below that the Idaho Income Tax Act

is

somehow precluded

Code

B.

§

in restitution following a conviction for

(Appellant’s

also unpreserved.

restitution.

courts across the country, the district court correctly recognized that unpaid

compensable

m

unpaid income taxes are akin t0 “a

claim for lost future earnings,” Which, under the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis in

Str_aub,

for the

0f the Idaho Income Tax Act “demonstrate that the legislature intended the

and collecting Idaho income tax,” which therefore cannot be awarded
brief, pp.

Tax

amount 0f income tax evaded by Foeller between the years 2013

(R., pp. 105-06; Tr., p. 154, Ls. 5-17.) Foeller

that provisions

State

income tax evasion.

Foeller

Along with

income taxes are
Nothing

in Idaho

19-5304 or the Idaho Income Tax Act suggests otherwise.

Standard

Of Review

Statutory interpretation

is

a question of law over which the Court exercises free review.

State V. Boren, 156 Idaho 498, 499,

328 P.3d 478, 479 (2014).

Oan

Argument—That Unpaid Income Taxes Are Akin To Future
Lost Wages And So Are Not Compensable In Restitution—Fails On The Merits
Foeller’s

C.

Foeller argued

in,”

Preserved

below

that

income taxes are “revenue” 0r “money

and so evaded income taxes d0 “not ﬁt the deﬁnition of economic

On

25.)

appeal, she

makes something

that at least

should conclude, “under the reasoning 0f

and

is

in restitution.

Str_aub,

loss.” (TL, p. 149, Ls. 18-

unpaid income taxes

which the Idaho Supreme Court held

292 P.3d 273 (2013), was not compensable

compensable
principle

Code

§

19-5304

of statutory interpretation

that,

construction.”

is

Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999)).

make

evaded income taxes

t0 the statute as written, Without

(Ct.

Court

1.5)

It is

“[w]here the language of a statute

489

this

not an ‘economic loss’

income tax evasion.

State V. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 97 P.3d

restitution statute is to

akin t0 a “claim

According to Foeller,

estimated income tax

in restitution following a conviction for

is

in State V. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,

and unambiguously makes

clearly

unambiguous, the Court must give effect

a well settled

is

plain and

engaging in statutory

App. 2004)

(citing State V.

In addition, the policy underlying the

Victims of criminal conduct whole while obviating the need for

additional civil proceedings t0 d0 so. In Interest 0f Miller, 110 Idaho 298,

5

is

not recoverable under the restitution statute.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-1

Idaho

be coming

vaguely resembles that argument, and so

likely preserved, claiming that a restitution request for

for lost future earnings,”

that should

299

n.2,

715 P.2d 968,

same section 0f her brief, Section I.C.2, Foeller references the Idaho Income Tax Act,
suggesting that the Act provides procedures that are a “prerequisite” and “mandatory” before
unpaid income taxes can be collected and so the Court should not permit them to be awarded in
In the

That is exactly the argument she provides in Section
Which is not preserved for appeal and Which is addressed below. Presumably, the
argument in Section I.C.2 is supposed t0 be distinct from the one provided in I.C. 1.

restitution. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-1 1.)

I.C.1,

969 n.2 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by Verska
Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011); State

App. 2002); State

V. Schultz,

is

§

Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796

(Ct.

ambiguous,

Moser V. Rosauers Supermarkets,
Idaho Code

151

148 Idaho 884, 886, 231 P.3d 529, 531

Court determines that the statute
policy.

V.

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

V. Saint

Inc.,

(Ct.

App. 2008).

If the

should be interpreted in light of that public

it

165 Idaho 133, 136, 443 P.3d 147, 150 (2019).6

19-5304 provides that the court “shall order a defendant found guilty of any

crime Which results in an economic loss t0 the Victim t0 make restitution t0 the Victim” for “any

economic

loss

which the Victim actually

restitution statute, the

suffers.”

I.C.

term “Victim” means, in relevant

a person or entity,

Who

suffers

economic

§

19-5304(2).

For purposes 0f the

part:

loss or injury as the result

of the

defendant’s criminal conduct[.]

LC.
nor

§ 19-5304(1)(e)(i).

is

There

n0 question

is

there any question that, if evaded

Tax Commission

that the Idaho State

income taxes

constitute an

economic

incurred “as the result” of the defendant’s criminal evasion of income taxes.

the unpaid taxes and the crime

between the crime and the

is

6

“Economic

loss”

is

loss is about as direct as

deﬁned

an “entity,”

they are a loss

Where

the loss

is

the intentional evasion of those taxes, the causal connection

Whether evaded income taxes owed
loss.

loss,

is

it

t0 the Idaho State

could be.

So, the remaining question

Tax Commission

constitute an

is

economic

as follows:

makes passing reference

suggesting that LC. § 19-5304 is a
criminal statute and so should be construed in her favor if ambiguous. (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
Foeller

But the rule of lenity applies only
is

to the rule

to “grievous

of

lenity,

ambiguity 0r uncertainty in a criminal statute that

not resolved by looking at the text, context, legislative history, 0r underlying policy 0f the

statute allows for multiple reasonable constructions.”

State V.

Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437, 441,

313 P.3d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2013). As discussed below, there is no grievous ambiguity, or even
ambiguity; even if there were an ambiguity, the policy 0f the restitution statute takes priority over
the rule 0f lenity in the analysis; and, ﬁnally, “restitution proceedings are civil in nature.”
V.

Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 920, 393 P.3d 576, 580

(2017).

m

“Economic

loss” includes, but

is

not limited

t0,

the value of property taken,

destroyed, broken, 0r otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket

from the criminal conduct,
tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful

losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting

but does not include less

death or emotional distress.

LC.

§ 19-5304(1)(a).

This deﬁnition

is

both “broad” and “non—exclusive.”

Idaho 20, 25, 343 P.3d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 2014); State

710

(Ct.

V.

State V. Reale, 158

Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708,

App. 2004).

As

a matter of ordinary language and

common

sense, the Idaho State

suffers

an economic loss when a tax payer criminally evades taxes.

money

to

Which

sense conclusion

was

it

is

legally entitled.

Foeller’s only argument

The

Tax Commission

state

below was

thereby loses

that that

common-

mistaken because unpaid income taxes represent “revenue” 0r “money that

should be coming in,” while the state “has paid nothing,” and therefore does not meet the
deﬁnition 0f economic loss.

Code

§

That argument

(TL, p. 149, Ls. 22-25.)

is

Without merit.

19-5304 allows restitution for “any economic loss the Victim actually suffers,” LC.

5304(2), including “lost wages,” LC. § 19-5304(1)(a).
interpretation that,

Where a general word 0r phrase

is

It is

Idaho
§ 19-

a well-settled principle of statutory

followed by a non-exclusive enumeration of

examples, the general word or phrase Will be construed as meaning things of like or similar class
0r character to those speciﬁcally enumerated.

760-61 (1942).

The

Pepple

explicitly non-exclusive

list

V.

Headrick, 64 Idaho 132, 128 P.2d 757,

of economic losses in Idaho Code

§

19-

m

5304(1)(a) demonstrates that Where criminal conduct directly results in a Victim being deprived

0f income that would otherwise have been realized, that constitutes economic
RLscll, 126 Idaho 38, 39, 878 P.2d 212, 213

(Ct.

lost

E

App. 1994) (holding, by analogy with

wages, that Where self—employed Victim spent time testifying

have been earning income,

loss.

income was an economic

at trial,

10st

during Which time he could

loss); State V. Reale,

158 Idaho 20, 25-

26, 343 P.3d 49, 54-55 (Ct.

is

App. 2014). That

is,

lost

revenue

is

just as

much an economic

loss as

an out-of—pocket expense.

Recognizing
that

for

that, courts in

other jurisdictions have held, like the district court did here,

unpaid income taxes constitute economic losses compensable in restitution

income tax evasion.

therefore agree

actual loss

.

.

E, 1g” People V.

that the

.

government

Crow, 864 P.2d

may be

80, 84 (Cal. 1993) (en bane)

the beneﬁciary of restitution if

due t0 the crime, as in the instance of tax evasion or

and quotation marks omitted)); State

(alterations

after a conviction

V.

theft

it

(“We

has incurred

of government property”

Hagen, 840 N.W.2d 140, 148 (Iowa 2013)

(holding that “Hagen’s failure t0 ﬁle or pay his taxes deprived the State of tax revenue, thus

causing the State pecuniary damages as a result 0f his criminal activity” and “[o]rdering Hagen to

pay

restitution t0 the State is

and the purposes 0f

M,

16 A.3d 61

1,

.

.

.

consistent with both the plain

restitution: t0

612-13 (Vt. 201

compensate Victims and
1) (district

meaning of the

m

restitution statute

rehabilitate defendants”);

court properly awarded restitution t0 the state for

unpaid taxes following conviction for tax evasion).

On
below.

that

She

relies

it

0n

is

unclear Whether Foeller intends t0 be making the argument she

State V. Straub, 153 Idaho

some forms 0f recovery

restitution.

here.

appeal,

In Str_aub, the Idaho

speculative future

882 (2013), apparently only for the proposition

available through a civil action

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-1

1.)

Though

Supreme Court held

wages and other expenses.”

made

may

not be available through

that is true, Str_aub provides

that a district court erred

Li. at 890,

292 P.3d

at

n0 support

When

it

at all

“awarded

281 (emphasis added).

Idaho Code § 19-5304 provides that “[r]estituti0n shall be ordered for any economic loss which
the Victim actually suffers” and the Court held that because future

actually suffered at the time restitution

is

economic losses have not been

awarded they are not available under the

statute.

Li;

ﬂ

also State V. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 267,

346 P.3d 279, 284 (2015)

(clarifying that Straub

stands only for the proposition that future economic losses are not available through restitution

because they have not been actually suffered).
state did not request

economic

and the

[Foller’s]

awarded

is it

The

n0 reason

pay taxes owed and evaded years
t0 think that

earlier,

income taxes owed and evaded

remotely relevant that the Idaho State Tax Commission “was not a Victim

embezzlement.” (Appellant’s

restitution as a Victim

is

brief, p. 11.)

The Idaho

State

Tax Commission was

0f her tax evasion, a crime t0 Which she pled

also convicted 0f another crime

crime

this appeal.

past do not constitute economic losses actually suffered by the Idaho State Tax

Commission. Nor
0f

Str_aub provides

do With

did not order that Foeller pay restitution for anyfuture

losses; the district court ordered her to

between 2013 and 2017.
in the

district court

Str_aub has nothing to

guilty.

That she was

and the Idaho State Tax Commission was not a Victim of

that

neither here nor there.

Finally, for

good reason, Foeller has not argued

that there

was not

substantial evidence t0

support the restitution amount, arguing only that there was not substantial evidence that the
allegedly “mandatory procedures” of the Idaho

was not

substantial evidence that she

Idaho Code

§

Income Tax Act were followed, and

would be able

t0

pay the

restitution

amount

that there

in the future.7

19-5304(6) provides that the amount of economic loss be proven by a

“preponderance of the evidence.” Foeller ﬁled a tax return in 2013, but ﬁled n0 returns in 2014,
2015, 2016, or 2017. (TL,

p. 132, L. 8

— p.

138, L. 7.) For each ofthose years, employing W-ZS,

bank records, and information regarding the amounts Foeller embezzled from her employer, a

7

Both arguments are addressed below.
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representative of the Idaho State

Tax Commission

—

testiﬁed regarding the

(TL, p. 132, L. 8

The preponderance of

the evidence supports the restitution

p. 138, L. 7.)

Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 824-25, 242 P.3d 189, 193-94
and grand

theft,

ﬁnding

that

(Ct.

district court correctly

amount ordered.

ﬂ

App. 2010) (following conviction

preponderance of the evidence supported restitution

award Where evidence regarding amount stolen centered around

The

m

Foeller provided no contrary evidence.

the unreported income.

for burglary

amount of tax owed 0n

concluded

that,

statistical

model).

under the clear and unambiguous terms 0f

Idaho Code § 19-5304, the Idaho State Tax Commission was a Victim of Foeller’s tax evasion,
suffering an

economic

Foeller has not

D.

shown

loss in the

amount of $48,775.00,

the

amount 0f income tax evaded.

otherwise.

An

Has Not Preserved Any Argument That The Idaho Income Tax Act Precludes
Award Of Restitution For Unpaid Income Taxes
Foeller

Foeller also (0r, perhaps exclusively) argues that the Idaho

particular,

Idaho Code §§ 63-3045 and

Act the “exclusive means

for assessing

63-3045A—makes

Income Tax Act—and

in

administrative proceedings under the

and collecting Idaho income tax” and “precludes both the

assessment 0f tax and any judicial proceedings for the collection of tax” except through those
proceedings, including as restitution following a conviction for tax evasion.

pp. 8-10.)

As

discussed in the next section, that argument

is

(Appellant’s brief,

Without merit. But, in addition,

it is

not preserved.

“Issues not raised

Will

be held

t0 the theory

below

will not be considered

upon Which

the case

by

this court

was presented

t0 the

on appeal, and the

lower court.” State

V.

parties

Garcia-

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (quotation marks omitted). This Court
has “long held that appellate court review

is

limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that

11

were presented beloW,”

Q

0n counsel presenting the

(quotation marks and brackets omitted),

facts

and law

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 226,

trial

court erred in

to address.”

(2019) (quotation marks omitted).

Idaho

at

it

chooses t0 support

its

position in the

trial

court,”

443 P.3d 231, 240 (2019). The Court “Will not hold that a

making a decision on an

have the opportunity

district court erred

that

and “has placed a premium

issue 0r a party’s position

0n an issue

State V. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 672,

“[I]t

would be inappropriate

that

it

did not

450 P.3d 315, 320

for this Court t0 rule that the

by not considering evidence or argument not presented

HLkins, 165

t0 it.”

225, 443 P.3d at 239 (quotation marks omitted).

Foeller

is

asking this Court t0 hold that the district court erred by awarding restitution

based 0n a theory and argument that she did not present t0 the

Below, Foeller

district court.

argued only that the unpaid income taxes were not compensable in restitution because the
“has paid nothing,” and the unpaid taxes are “revenue” 0r

“money

and therefore do not “ﬁt the deﬁnition of economic

loss.”

(TL, p. 149, Ls. 22-25.)

argued, suggested, or implied that the Idaho Income

Tax Act somehow precludes

that should

unpaid income taxes or provides any mandatory procedures With Which the
comply.

In fact, she never cited the Idaho

Income Tax Act. Because the

state

be coming

state

in,”

She never

restitution for

must but did not

district court

was not

provided the opportunity t0 address Foeller’s argument that the Idaho Income Tax Act precludes

restitution,

it

would be inappropriate

for this Court t0 reverse the district court

Foeller has not preserved that argument and

Though
appeal,

it is

that basis.

limited t0 the argument presented below.

may

“evolve” on

224, 443 P.3d at 238, the argument had t0 have been

made below

The argument Foeller made below—that evaded income taxes

are revenue

true that this Court has held that an appellant’s

HLkins, 165 Idaho

in order t0 evolve.

is

0n

at

argument

and so do not constitute an economic loss—is completely different than the argument

12

that the

Idaho Income Tax Act precludes an award of evaded income taxes through restitution. The only

commonality

enough

to

is

that they are

make them

the

arguments for the same conclusion, which

“same horse”

for purposes

of preservation.

is

undoubtedly not

E

State V. Garcia-

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (though state argued below that arrest

was

constitutional because

it

was authorized by Idaho law, argument on appeal

constitutional even if not authorized

by Idaho law was not preserved);

Interest

Idaho 57, 454 P.3d 1140, 1146 (2019) (though appellant argued below that
the court t0 reschedule

permanency hearing, argument

that

it

that the arrest

was improper

it

of Doe

was

I,

was improper

166
for

t0 reschedule hearing

because doing so constituted a due process Violation was not preserved); State

V. Fuller,

163

Idaho 585, 590-91, 416 P.3d 957, 962-63 (2018) (though state argued below that ofﬁcer had
reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct based on one statute, argument that ofﬁcer had
reasonable suspicion of unlawﬁll conduct based 0n another was not preserved); State

165 Idaho 338, 343-44, 445 P.3d 147, 151-52 (2019) (though

state

V.

Wolfe,

argued below that evidence

should not be excluded based on the attenuation doctrine, holding

that,

though independent

source and attenuation are “similar doctrines,” argument that evidence should not be excluded

under the independent source doctrine was not preserved); State

V.

Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667,

672, 450 P.3d 315, 320 (2019) (though state argued below that defendant

was lawfully detained

because ofﬁcers had reasonable suspicion 0f criminal conduct, argument that ofﬁcers acquired
reasonable suspicion and the detention began second later than the point at Which the district
court held the detention began

was not preserved);

State V. Demint, 161 Idaho 23

1,

233, 384 P.3d

995, 997 (Ct. App. 2016) (“Although Demint preserved for appeal the general issue that there

was n0 probable cause

t0 search the enclosed truck bed,

challenge than were argued before the district court”).

13

he cannot argue more grounds for that

Foeller’s argument regarding the allegedly preclusive effect of the Idaho

is

wholly new on appeal. That

different

it is

Income Tax Act

an argument for the same conclusion for which she offered a

argument below does not change

that fact.

The

district

was not given

court

the

opportunity t0 address the argument and should not be held t0 have erred by failing t0 do so.

E.

Even If The Argument Is Preserved, Foeller Has Not Shown That The Idaho Income Tax
Act Precludes The Award Of Restitution Here
Foeller relies on

and 63-3045A,

two provisions 0f the Idaho Income Tax Act, Idaho Code §§ 63-30450)

t0 argue that the

Act provides the exclusive means

for assessing

and collecting

unpaid income taxes and “precludes” an award 0f unpaid income taxes as restitution following a
conviction for income tax evasion.

argument

is

not preserved.

Idaho Code

§

It is

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

As

discussed above, that

also without merit.

63-3045(1)(a) provides that the Idaho State Tax Commission will provide

notice of a tax deﬁciency and regarding the taxpayer’s rights to appeal through an administrative

hearing. Section 63-3045(c) provides that,

proceeding in court for

its

collection, shall

“N0 assessment 0f a deﬁciency

.

be made, begun, or prosecuted”

been mailed and the taxpayer has exercised her right t0 protest 0r the time

.

.

and no

distraint or

until that notice has

t0

d0 so has passed.

Section 63-3045A then provides that, “Except as provided in subsection (2) 0f this section, no
tax

commission

collect a tax

section.”

LC.

activities to enforce collection

be

0f tax

may be

instituted, until taxes are assessed in

§ 63-3045A(1)(a).

assessed after a protest

is

conducted, nor

may a proceeding

according With the provisions of this

Following notice of the tax deﬁciency, the tax

is

ﬁled and resolved, or the time t0 protest has passed.

3045A(1)(d).

14

t0

considered

I.C.

§ 63-

Foeller argues that

you cannot have a

judicial proceeding to collect

0n a tax deﬁciency

without an assessment, and you cannot have an assessment without the taxpayer having received
notice 0f the deﬁciency.

conclusion that

it is

From

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)

that,

she

somehow

reaches the

never appropriate t0 award evaded income taxes through restitution and the

Idaho Income Tax Act provides the exclusive means to recover unpaid income taxes.

E

course, that does not follow.

I.C. §

63-3050 (providing

that the

remedy

unpaid income taxes included in that Act “shall be in addition to any and

At best—and,

remedies”).

even

as discussed below,

this is

But, of

for collection of

all

other existing

not true—what follows

is

that

it is

inappropriate t0 award evaded income taxes through restitution Where there has not been notice

and an assessment.
There

is

n0 reason

was no

to believe that there

discussed, Foeller did not raise this issue below.

presented

at the restitution

When

a result, there

§

63-3045(1)(a).

§§ 63-3045(1)(a), 63-3045A(1)(d).
in January

Commission believed

If she

there

At a minimum,

was a

in July

tax deﬁciency and

(R., pp.

71-73 (restitution request, With

down

owed by

year).)

were not

did receive a notice,

was

it

became an

resolved.

I.C.

of 2019, six months before the

of 2020, Foeller was well aware that the Idaho State Tax

deﬁciency.

taxes

already

was no discussion or evidence

she failed to protest Within sixty—three days, or her protest

restitution hearing

As

hearing regarding Whether Foeller received a notice of deﬁciency in

accordance with Idaho Code
assessment

As

notice and assessment here.

was aware of

letter

the

amount 0f

from the Tax Commission breaking

She clearly had notice 0f a tax deﬁciency. Even

in the record, though, Foeller is asking the

if that

evidence

Court t0 simply assume that n0 notice was

provided in order t0 support an argument that she did not raise below.
correctly recognized, under the plain language of Idaho

15

the alleged

Code

As

§ 19-5304, the

the district court

Idaho State Tax

Commission was a Victim of
economic

Foeller’s

income tax evasion, the evaded income taxes were an

and the Commission was

loss,

entitled to restitution.

If Foeller believed that

some

provision 0f the Idaho Income Tax Act nevertheless precluded restitution in this case because of

an inadequate notice under the Act,
statutes,

was her

it

obligation t0 argue as

much,

cite the applicable

and provide relevant evidence.

But evaded income taxes

may be awarded

in restitution

Whether or not there has been an

assessment under the Idaho Income Tax Act.

The

0n which Foeller

statutes

relies

provide that the Idaho State Tax Commission

not employ the mechanisms for collection 0f unpaid taxes provided by the
or levy proceedings,

wage garnishment,

liens

Act—such

may

as distraint

0n personal property, etc.—Without a notice and

assessment. I.C. §§ 63-3045(1)(c), 63-3045A(1), 63-3060. Restitution proceedings have nothing
t0

d0 With those mechanisms.

Idaho Income Tax Act, nor

E

Commission.
(holding that

it is

debt 0r obligation

sort

E

it

a proceeding 0f any sort initiated

the prosecutor, not the Victim,

may

by

the Idaho State

470 P.3d 1263, 1267-69

Who

is

(Ct.

Tax

App. 2020)

entitled t0 pursue restitution).

That a

not recoverable by the Victim in a separate civil proceeding 0f a certain

it

may

not be requested by the prosecutor and ordered by the court as

State V. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 299, 160 P.3d 451,

that “the district court could

loss

is

State V. Johnson, 167 Idaho 454,

does not imply that

restitution.

A restitution proceeding is not a proceeding 0f any sort under the

award the directly—injured Victim the

456

full

(Ct.

App. 2007) (noting

amount 0f the economic

even though an insurance company had already paid the directly—injured Victim for the

loss”); State V.

Hamilton, 129 Idaho 938, 942-43, 935 P.2d 201, 205-06 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding

that court could

award Victim

restitution

even for amount that the defendant had already

discharged in bankruptcy, and that a civil settlement does not bar restitution); State V. Sweat, 561

16

N.W.2d

695, 696-703 (Wise. 1997) (rejecting proposition that district court could not award

amount

restitution for

due

t0 a civil statute

(N.M.

Ct.

App.

that the Victim

would not be able

of limitations); State

Sept. 16, 2019) (same).

V.

Low, N0. A-l-CA-36561, 2019

district court

some

other legal

from ordering

Restrictions

proceeding

WL 5098291, at *2

Just as “[a]n order of restitution shall not preclude the

Victim from seeking any other legal remedy,”
the Victim of

t0 recover in a separate civil

LC.

§

19-5304(1

remedy does not preclude

1),

the alleged unavailability to

the prosecutor

from requesting and the

restitution.

on the manner

in

which the Idaho

State

Tax Commission could pursue

unpaid income taxes under the provisions of the Idaho Income Tax Act are irrelevant t0 Whether
the prosecutor

may

request and the district court

But neither does the Idaho Income Tax Act

may

order restitution for evaded income taxes.

Tax Commission’s

ability t0 recover

The Act repeatedly

characterizes the

restrict the

unpaid income taxes in the manner Foeller suggests.

remedies and proceedings made available therein as “in addition t0” any other legal remedy
available for the collection of unpaid

provides that n0 assessment

is

income

It

necessary prior to instituting judicial proceedings, as opposed t0

the administrative proceedings authorized

the Act, t0 collect unpaid taxes if

by

appropriate” under the circumstances to do so.

m,

LC. §§ 63-3050, 63-6063, 6064(a).

taxes.

LC. §§ 63-3045A(2), 63-6064(a);

112 Idaho 105, 107, 730 P.2d 1025, 1027

(Ct.

App. 1986) (holding

that

it

m

is

ﬂ

“more

n0 administrate

proceeding was necessary Where the only allegation, as here, was 0f willful failure to report
income).

that

Contrary t0 Foeller’s assertion 0n appeal, the Idaho Income Tax Act does not provide

evaded income taxes

may

only be collected by the Commission through the administrative

proceedings provided by the Act, 0r that an assessment
proceedings.
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is

necessary prior to instituting judicial

Foeller additionally suggests that “a single restitution statute

code in determining tax

entire tax

because, in

some circumstances,

Code

is

a deﬁciency.

(Id.)

she thinks,

For example, under certain

§ 63-3022(c)(2) permits a taxpayer t0 “carry

taxpayer to a refund.

is so,

the tax code permits “adjustments t0 a tax liability for events

loss in the current year t0 a previous year, retroactively reducing

entitle the

That

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

liability.”

occurring after” the year in which there
circumstances, Idaho

a poor substitute for the

is

As an

initial matter, this

income

provision

back” a net operating

in that year,

is

Which may

inapplicable here.

It

permits a taxpayer to carry back losses t0 the prior two years.

Foeller failed to pay taxes on

income between 2013 and 2017, more than two years before the

restitution proceedings in 2020.

In addition, the provision requires the ﬁling 0f an

carrying back the loss.

taxpayer

is

amended

returns.

More

amended

Which the

return from the year t0

Foeller did not ﬁle returns, and so arguably cannot ﬁle

importantly, permitting evaded income taxes to be awarded in restitution

does not, in any way, suggest that “a single restitution statute” operates as a “substitute for the
entire tax

code in determining tax

liability.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)

The

tax code

is

relevant to

determine the amount of tax evaded, which in turn determines the amount of the economic loss
recoverable as restitution. The restitution statute does not “substitute” for the tax code any

than

it

substitutes for the

legal obligation

causation.

E

law relevant

to, for

example, legal obligations under a contract; the

0f employer t0 an employee with respect to wages; or the appropriate analysis of
State V. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 160 P.3d 451 (Ct.

order of restitution to an insurance

company where

App. 2007) (vacating an

the State failed to present evidence 0f a

contractual relationship With the primary Victim); State V. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 213,

412, 419 (Ct. App. 2012) (looking to the law of
court’s

more

award of

restitution

LLCs and ﬁduciary

from one member of an

18

LLC

to the

296 P.3d

duties t0 uphold a district

remaining members); State

V.

Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374-75, 223 P.3d 750, 757-58 (2009) (looking
respect t0 causation for purposes of restitution).

particular

amount

constitutes an

economic

is

It

to the

common law With

obvious and inevitable that Whether a

loss will frequently, perhaps always,

depend 0n law

that is not set out in the restitution statute, including with respect to legal obligations

between the

defendant and the Victim, 0r the defendant and some third-party. The restitution statute does not
“substitute” for the

law governing those obligations.

Finally, Foeller argues that the Idaho State

Victims

who

activity.”

restitution contingent

0n a lack of legal

294 P.3d 1151, 1153

(Ct.

“0bViat[ing]

is

“unlike those crime

are ill-prepared to pursue a civil action to recover a loss caused

(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) But Idaho

matter the

Tax Commission

legal

Code

§

19-5304 does not make the availability of

sophistication.

App. 2013) (afﬁrming award

sophistication

by criminal

E

State V.

Acuna, 154 Idaho 139, 141,

to the Idaho State Insurance Fund).

No

m

of the Victim, restitution preserves judicial resources by

the need for a separate

civil

action t0 compensate crime Victims.”

Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624, 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 2004), in addition to accomplishing
the goals 0f deterrence and rehabilitation, State V. Johnson, 167 Idaho 454,

(Ct.

may

App. 2020) (“because

restitution

may fulﬁll

behind our restitution
loss.

deterrent 0r rehabilitative purposes, a prosecutor

additionally pursue restitution for the beneﬁt of the State”).

137 Idaho 35, 38-39, 43 P.3d 794, 797-98

By

statute favors full

establishing that

evidence standard, LC.

§

(Ct.

App. 2002)

compensation

economic losses are

470 P.3d 1263, 1268

to

to

E

(“It is

also State V.

Richmond,

often stated that the policy

crime Victims

be determined by a

civil

Who

suffer

economic

preponderance of the

19-5304(6), the legislature clearly intended t0 allow

trial

courts in a

criminal case t0 resolve the restitution question, thus freeing the crime Victim 0f the burden 0f

19

instituting a civil action

based 0n the same conduct, and our court system from unnecessary,

repetitive trials.” (citations omitted».

Foeller has not

shown

Tax Commission

State

by awarding

that the district court erred

for taxes willfully

restitution t0 the Idaho

evaded following her conviction for income tax

evasion.

II.

The

District Court

Did Not Abuse

Its

Resources, Needs,

A.

BV Failing To Consider Foeller’s
And Ability To Pay

Discretion

Introduction

Foeller next argues that the district court abused

to

Financial

Travelers—her employer’s

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

She claims

(Id.)

is

by awarding $535,952.87

equal t0 What she embezzled

failed to “properly consider[]” her future ability

that the “district court’s failure to

Foeller could in the foreseeable future be able to pay the

0f reason.”

discretion

an amount she concedes

insurer, in

from her employer—because the court allegedly
t0 pay.

its

amount ordered, demonstrates a

statute.

But, she

is

also mistaken.

The

properly considered her ﬁnancial resources and earning ability as one factor in

entire

B.

The court was not required
at

some point

Standard

Of Review

amount

trial

Ms.

failure

to

ﬁnd

that Foeller

would

its

district court

discretionary

certainly be able t0

pay the

in the future.

The decision Whether
court’s discretion.

that

Foeller has not preserved the argument, having waived any issue except

Whether the award was authorized by

determination.

ﬁnd

to order restitution

and

State V. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211,

in

What amount

is

296 P.3d 412, 417

committed
(Ct.

t0 the trial

App. 2013). The

court’s factual ﬁndings in relation t0 restitution will not be disturbed if supported

20

by

Straub, 153 Idaho at 885,

substantial evidence.

602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (201

C.

292 P.3d

at

276; State V. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599,

1).

Has Not Preserved For Appeal Any Argument That The
Discretion BV Awarding Restitution Authorized BV Statute
Foeller

A

may waive

defendant

settlement.

District Court

Abused

Its

the right to appeal a particular issue as part of a pretrial

I.C.R. 11(f)(1); State V.

Mugphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994).

Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, they generally are examined by courts in
accordance with contract law standards.

(2005).

The

interpretation

and

legal effect

Court. State V. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-1

As

part

of

her

pre-trial

0f such agreements constitutes a legal question for the

1,

64 P.3d 335, 336—37

settlement

agreement,

restitution/reimbursement: If applicable per statute: for

p. 56.)

In so doing, she

waived the

restitution authorized “per statute.”

“shall” order restitution for

399

State V. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397,

all

(Ct.

App. 2003).

Foeller

agreed

“Pay

t0

charges, even those dismissed.”

right to appeal a restitution order to the extent that

it

(R.,

ordered

Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court

economic

loss actually suffered

by the

Victim.

I.C. § 19-5304(2).

Nevertheless, the court may, in the district court’s discretion, decline t0 order restitution or order
less than full restitution after considering other factors, including “the ﬁnancial resources, needs,

and earning

ability

of the defendant.”

I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7).

In agreeing t0

pay

restitution as

authorized by statute, the only argument Foeller preserved for appeal With respect to restitution

is

an argument that the

it

awarded an amount
while the restitution
not to award

it.

district court

ordered restitution not permitted by statute—that

that did not constitute

is

an economic

loss.

21

that

She waived any argument

authorized by statute, the district court should have exercised

The contrary conclusion—that Foeller preserved

is,

the right to argue

its

that,

discretion

on appeal

that

the district court should have exercised

discretion not t0

its

award an amount otherwise

authorized by statute—makes a nullity of the agreement t0 pay restitution as authorized “per

The agreement

statute.”

to

pay

restitution authorized

Foeller can challenge an order to

court abused

its

discretion

by

pay

by

restitution authorized

suffered an economic loss in the

district court

statute.

D.

The

that

statute.

at all if

In arguing that the district

that Travelers is a Victim, that Travelers

amount 0f $535,952.87, or

that the restitution statute authorizes

Rather, she argues that, in consideration of her circumstances, the

should have exercised

She waived

by

n0 agreement

failing t0 properly consider her future ability to pay, Foeller is

making exactly such an argument. She does not dispute

an award of that amount.

statute constitutes

its

discretion t0

award

less than the

amount authorized by

argument by agreeing t0 pay restitution as authorized by

statute.

Recognized The Distinction Between Immediate And Foreseeable
T0 Pay And Reasonably Determined That The Restitution Awarded Was

District Court

Ability

Appropriate In Light

Even

if preserved,

Of That Distinction

her argument that the district court abused

its

discretion

is

meritless.

Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court “shall” order restitution for

economic

loss actually suffered

by the

Victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2). Nevertheless, the court may, in

the district court’s discretion, decline to order restitution or order less than ﬁlll restitution after

considering other factors, including “the ﬁnancial resources, needs, and earning ability 0f the
defendant.”

I.C. § 19-5304(3), (7).

inability t0

pay neither precludes nor

factor for a court’s consideration

V. Olp_in,

While a

district court is

required to consider these factors,

limits a restitution award; rather, ability t0

When

it

makes a

140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708, 710

is

only one

discretionary restitution determination.

(Ct.

22

pay

App. 2004)

m

(citing State V. Taie, 138 Idaho

878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003)).

In fact, an immediate inability to

pay

is

never

sufﬁcient alone to decline to award restitution. LC. § 19-5304(7).

On

appeal, Foeller argues that the district court abused

its

discretion

by

failing t0 consider

her ability t0 pay restitution at some time in the future. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-16.) In support

0f that View, she

relies exclusively

0n

State V. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661,

GLcia, the Idaho Supreme Court held

462 P.3d 1125 (2020). In

that a district court’s restitution order

was an abuse of

discretion because, While the district court correctly recognized that an immediate ability to

award

restitution is not a sufﬁcient reason not t0

distinction

between present and foreseeable

defendant’s foreseeable ability t0 pay.

its

Li

at

the district court failed t0 recognize a

pay

ability t0

_, 462 P.3d

discretion, according to the Court, because

at all.” Li. at

it,

it

pay

restitution

at

and

failed t0 consider the

1146-47. The district court abused

“did not address Garcia’s future ability t0 repay

_, 462 P.3d at 1147.

Unlike in GLcia, the

district court

here explicitly acknowledged the distinction between

present and foreseeable ability to pay restitution and determined, in light 0f that distinction and in

its

discretion, that

economic

loss.

it

was appropriate

(TL, p. 154, L. 18

— p.

t0 order Foeller t0

155. L. 5.)

The

pay the

district court

full

amount 0f Travelers”

noted that “the defendant

not going to be incarcerated forever, the defendant does have the ability t0 earn

have the

ability t0

conclusion

is

pay some 0f

this

back

at

some

point.”

money and does

(TL, p. 154, Ls. 22-25.)

supported by substantial and competent evidence. Foeller was only forty-ﬁve

That

When

convicted and was sentenced to fourteen years, but with just three years determinate. (PSI, p.

T11, p. 26, L.

21

—

p. 27, L. 2.)

employment when she

is

She

is

is

7;

well-educated and clearly capable of long-term, gainﬁJI

not engaged in criminal conduct.

She has earned both a bachelor of

science degree and a Master’s degree in accounting and taxation.

23

(PSI, pp. 17-18.)

Prior to the

embezzlement resulting

and her termination, she had worked for her

in her criminal charges

employer for nearly ten years, becoming an Accounting Manager, and earning $65,000 per year.

Her

(PSI, p. 18.)

She

50, 53.)

is

letters

0f support repeatedly and emphatically laude her work

district court’s

768 P.2d 804

award 0f

was an abuse 0f discretion because
in light

rej ected that

for restitution

an amount exceeding

upon

Em,

115 Idaho

t0

pay

restitution,

his eventual release

it

at

Bybee [would] ever meet the
court did not abuse

its

ﬁlll

district court

pay

determined he would be able “t0 earn

from prison.”

Li.

Though

discretion in ordering that

Lig

As

in

Bybee, the

district court

for restitution

the Court 0f Appeals stated

it

“it

[was] unlikely

nevertheless held that the

amount Where

upon

money

the district court

his eventual release

from

here considered Foeller’s future ability t0 pay

Bybee expressed some reservations about whether the order would be
counterfactually, the district court had required installments or set a
payment. Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 768 P.2d at 806. Because it did not do so, “the

The Court 0f Appeals

an abuse of discretion
deadline for

money

The Court 0f

recognized that though Bybee

amount of restitution ordered,”

considered his future ability “to earn
prison.”

Bybee

1.5 million dollars

543, 768 P.2d at 806.

given “the magnitude of the amounts involved” in the restitution order,

district

8

is instructive.

serving an uncertain period 0f incarceration under an

argument, noting that while the

would be immediately unable

that

App. 1989),

of the amount of the restitution ordered and the fact that he was “

indeterminate fourteen-year sentence.”

that,

restitution in

(Ct.

the court failed t0 adequately consider his future ability to

ha[d] n0 present assets, and [was]

Appeals

(PSI, pp.

also married, With the support 0f her husband. (PSI, p. 16.)

State V. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541,

argued that the

ethic.

in

if,

order simply gives the Victims the present ability t0 obtain a judgment.”

Li.

Like the order in

Bybee, the order here does not require installment payments or provide a deadline t0 pay the full
simply gives the Victims the present ability t0 obtain a judgment. (R., pp. 105-

restitution, but

06.)

24

towards restitution in determining What restitution to order.

Bybee was

sixteen years younger than

What Bybee was ordered

Supreme Court

in both

The

t0 pay.

and the

restitution ordered

Em was

cited approvingly

at sentencing,

analysis in

GLcia, 166 Idaho

at

In addition, Foeller

_, 462 P.3d

at

1146, and State V.

roughly

is

was a
by

third

0f

the Idaho

Wisdom, 161

Idaho 916, 924-25, 393 P.3d 576, 584-85 (2017).
Foeller’s

claim that the

argument that the

district court

future, certainly

district court nevertheless

was required

to expressly

the ability

pay some 0f this back

she would have the ability to pay
(quoting Tr., p. 154, L. 20

rejected the

its

View

—

p.

all

0f

it

at

ﬁnd that Foeller would,

at

back.

155, L. 5).)

was problematic because

some

In

amounts

t0 the

some point

in the

discretion

be able to pay every cent of the amount ordered. (Appellant’s

Foeller claims that the district court’s discussion

would “have

abused

brief, pp. 14-15.)

it

stated that she

point,” rather than speciﬁcally

ﬁnding

that

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (emphasis omitted)

GLcia, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly

that the district court is required t0

make some

defendant’s future ability t0 pay the restitution awarded.

precise forecast regarding the

The Court

emphasize that “nothing in our decision today should suggest that a

in Garcia

was

district court is

careful to

required t0

divine a defendant’s future ﬁnancial capabilities, or that a district court should limit a Victim’s

right to restitution to

Foeller’s argument

what

is

amounts

presently

known about

the defendant.”

to the claim that the district court

Li

abused

at

its

_, 462 P.3d
discretion

by

at

1147.

failing t0

“divine” her “future ﬁnancial capabilities,” notwithstanding the fact that the court recognized the

between present and future

distinction

inability to

pay and ordered

restitution in light

of that

distinction.

Notably,

166 Idaho

at

GLcia approvingly

_, 462 P.3d

at

1146.

discusses the analysis in both

As

Em

and Wisdom. GLcia,

discussed above, in Bybee the Court of Appeals afﬁrmed

25

the restitution order though

was properly afﬁrmed though

amount,

it

it

it

was “unlikely

Em, 115 Idaho

amount 0f restitution ordered.”

the full

court

speciﬁcally stated that

it

at 543,

Bybee

that

768 P.2d

at 806.

was “unlikely” Bybee would ever pay

cannot be a requirement that the

district court

ﬁnd

will ever

meet

If the district

the ﬁlll restitution

that the defendant Will

pay the

full

restitution

amount. Likewise, in Wisdom, the Idaho Supreme Court afﬁrmed a restitution order

Where the

district court

district court in

to

pay

used almost exactly the language Foeller complains about here.

Wisdom found that while Wisdom’s minimum wage job

restitution immediately,

“C

there

is

nothing that the Court

is

The

likely did not permit her

aware of that would preclude

her from perhaps moving up, realizing an increase in her salary and at some point being able t0 at

least

make some payment towards

the restitution requested in the case.”

924, 393 P.3d at 584 (quoting the district court).

Wisdom, 161 Idaho

The Idaho Supreme Court found

“substantial evidence supporting that conclusion”—that

Wisdom was

at

was

“capable 0f working t0

repay the restitution award”—and therefore afﬁrmed the restitution order.

P.3d

that there

at

Li. at

924-25, 393

584-85. According t0 the Court, the district court’s ﬁnding was sufﬁcient consideration

0f Wisdom’s ﬁxture
district court

ability t0 pay,

did not abuse

its

supported by substantial and competent evidence, and the

discretion.

Unlike in Garcia, and as in

Wisdom and Bybee,

considered Foeller’s future ability t0 pay restitution

of Travelers’ economic

loss.

ﬁnancial capabilities,” which

The
is

district court

precisely

when

the district court here speciﬁcally

ordering Foeller t0 pay the

was not required

what Foeller

is

full

amount

t0 “divine [Foeller’s] future

arguing the district court should have

done.

Next, Foeller purports t0 provide evidence casting doubt on the conclusion that she will

be in a position to pay

restitution.

Even

if Foeller is correct that there is

26

conﬂicting evidence

regarding her future ability to pay restitution, conﬂicting evidence does not
discretion.

is

Rankin

V.

show an abuse 0f

Rankin, 107 Idaho 621, 623, 691 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1984) (“The

trial

the arbiter of conﬂicting evidence; in the absence 0f clear abuse of discretion, and

substantial competent evidence supports such ruling,

But neither do these alleged
the fact that she

Again, she
restitution

is

is far

facts

Who was

younger than was Bybee,
sixty—one,

and Wisdom, Foeller claims
like the district courts in

inability to

is

that she is

to

is

issues that are being treated,

unable t0

that she

is,

115 Idaho

at

like

make payments towards

not sufﬁcient reason t0 award less than the

and

in

both Bybee

restitution, but

the district court here correctly determined that the

There

was

is

n0 question

full

economic

are long-standing issues

would prevent her from

gainful

and there

is

no reason

employment and payments towards

at all to

loss,

mental health

that Foeller has

entitled t0 Social Security Disability

March 0f 2018, but those

As noted

m,

That

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

Bybee and Wisdom,

pay

much

“currently indigent and disabled,” unemployed, and

now

looking instead to her future ability to pay.

.)

appeal.”).

ordered t0 pay three times as

which order was afﬁrmed on appeal.

for Social Security beneﬁts.

(PSI, pp. 13, 61

upon

have the import Foeller suggests they do. She points

543, 768 P.2d at 806. She claims that she

immediate

Will not be disturbed

Where

forty-ﬁve (Appellant’s brief, p. 15), but that fact cuts against her, not for her.

when he was

had qualiﬁed

it

court

beneﬁts as of

think that they

restitution in the future.

above, despite long-standing mental health issues, Foeller was able t0

earn a Master’s degree in taxation and accounting and to

years in a supervisory accounting position.

work

(PSI, pp. 17-18.)

for the

The

same business
district court

for over ten

had excellent

reason to think that Foeller could and would be gainﬁllly employed following her period of
incarceration.
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Next, Foeller argues

and barely able

When

that,

to provide for her

own

released from prison, she “will likely be a single

woman

needs.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) In support, she cites a

know Whether

portion of her attorney’s argument in which he acknowledged that he does not

Foeller and her husband Will divorce (TL, p. 148, Ls. 10-18), and a page 0f the PSI

provides absolutely no suggestion that they will

(PSI, p. 23).

In fact,

0n

that

page of the PSI

Foeller suggests that, with treatment, she can “be of benefit” t0 “her spouse,”

suggests an impending divorce.

(Id.;

ﬂ alﬂ

with her husband and her daughters” and

no plans
the

t0 move”).)

same home

.

.

For his

“is

part, Foeller’s

PSI, p. 15 (reporting that she

happy with her current

husband stated

is

Which

Which hardly

“currently living

living arrangement

that they are “together

and has

and residing

.[and] did not indicate they are separated 0r considering a divorce[,]

in

and

referred to [Foeller] as ‘a loving wife.” (PSI, p. 16.)

Finally, citing Idaho

applications,

capacity.”

Code

§

54-2019, concerned With the denial of real estate license

she argues that her conviction will “signiﬁcantly reduce her future earning

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

Assuming

Foeller intended t0 cite Idaho

and/or 54-208, concerned With licensing of accountants,

would prevent her from receiving a
they did,

it

is

unclear Whether those statutes

license or certiﬁcation in light of her conviction. But, even if

hardly follows that the district court was required to decline t0 award the

0f Travelers’ economic
service.

it

Code §§ 54-207

Em,

Bybee was convicted 0f defrauding

loss.

115 Idaho

difﬁcult 0r impossible for

at

542, 768 P.2d at 805.

him

N0

clients in his

doubt, his conviction

full

amount

investment

would make

to provide investment services after his release

it

from prison.

Nonetheless, the district court appropriately awarded 1.5 million dollars in economic loss

because Bybee had “the business acumen t0 earn

from prison.”

Li. at 543,

768 P.2d

at 806.

money

Foeller
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is

for restitution

upon

his eventual release

clearly very intelligent, well educated, with

signiﬁcant experience.

Even

if

she cannot

work

as a certiﬁed public accountant in Idaho, there is

every reason to think that she will be gainfully employed and can pay restitution.
Foeller has

not

shown

that

the

district

court abused

its

discretion

by

failing

t0

“adequately” consider her future ability to pay restitution.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the

district court’s

order of restitution.

11th day of December, 2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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